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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 990764-CA 
v. : 
KENNETH J. WEBSTER, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of wrongful appropriation, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5 (Supp. 1998) (in Add. A). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Were the out-of-court statements made by defendant's wife to a police officer 
properly admitted under a residual hearsay exception, despite the wife's later invocation 
of her marital testimonial privilege, when defendant knew of the State's intent to use the 
statements and the statements had sufficient indicia of reliability under the Confrontation 
Clause? 
A trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, and its 
determination typically will be disturbed only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. See 
State v. Whittle. 1999 UT 96, ^ 20, 989 P.2d 52; State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 
1994). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts unreasonably. See State v. Larsen. 865 
P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993); State v. Drawn. 791 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah App. 1990). 
The sufficiency of notice under the residual exceptions to the hearsay rule is 
likewise reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Brown. 770 F.2d 
768, 771 (9th Cir. 1985), cert, denied 474 U.S. 1036, 106 S. Ct. 603 (1985). 
2. Did the trial court properly admit defendant's admission that he had previously 
committed a similar offense when that admission was relevant to the material issues of 
identity and intent, and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice? 
The appellate court reviews a decision to admit evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, 
or acts under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Decorso. 1999 UT 57, ^ [18, 993 
P.2d 837, cert, denied 120 S. Ct. 1181 (2000). 
3. Did the trial court properly refuse to reduce defendant's conviction to an 
infraction when defendant was convicted of third degree felony wrongful appropriation as 
defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(3)(a) (Supp. 1998)? 
Determining the penalty for a crime is a question of law which this Court reviews 
for correctness. State v. Rhodes. 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah App. 1991). 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions pertinent to resolution 
of the issues presented on appeal is contained in or appended to this brief, including: 
U.S. Const. Amend. VI (Add. G) Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1311 (Supp. 1997) 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12 (Add. G) Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-105 (1999) 
Utah R. Evidence 402 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999) 
Utah R. Evidence 403 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5 (Supp. 1998) 
Utah R. Evidence 404(b) Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1999). 
Utah R. Evidence 804(b)(3) (Add. F) 
Utah R. Evidence 804(b)(5) (Add. F) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with theft of an operable motor vehicle, a 
second degree felony (R. 1-2). The morning of trial, defense counsel filed three motions. 
The first sought to permit defendant's wife to assert her constitutional right not to testify 
against defendant (R. 22-23). The trial court took the matter under consideration and 
revisited it before the State called its final witness at trial (R. 38: 38-39, 96-103).1 
Defendant's wife in fact invoked her privilege during trial, and the trial court ruled that 
her spontaneous pre-trial statements to a police officer when he informed her of 
defendant's arrest were sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 804(b)(3) and (b)(5) (R. 38:102-03). 
'Citation herein to transcripts will be to the volume number stamped on the cover 
of each transcript volume, followed by a colon and the internal page number, i.e., R. 38: 
7. 
3 
The second and third motions sought to exclude defendant's statement to the 
arresting officer that he had previously stolen a car from a dealership lot in Virginia (R. 
25-26). The court deferred ruling, opting to see how the evidence developed so that he 
could properly balance probative value and prejudice (R. 38:45-46). Thereafter, the court 
admitted the evidence, finding it to be relevant to intent, identity and absence of mistake 
(R. 38:93). 
Following a one-day trial, the jury acquitted defendant of theft and convicted him 
of the lesser offense of wrongful appropriation (R. 34-35, 38:147). The court ordered a 
presentence investigation report, and defendant sought clarification of the degree of the 
offense (R. 37, 42-51, 53:5-13). The trial court found the offense to be a third degree 
felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(3)(a) (Supp. 1998), and sentenced defendant 
to serve 180 days in jail (R. 55-56; 53:13-14). He suspended 165 days and imposed 
eighteen months probation and a fine (R. 55-56). Defendant timely appealed (R. 60-61). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
On June 22, 1998, Intermountain Volkswagen acquired a 1988 Nissan Stanza (R. 
38:61, 71). The car was placed in a fenced area at the back of Intermountain's lot with 
other trade-ins to be kept untouched until "bought by a bank and approved and funded" 
(R. 38:62). Trade-ins were not driven by salesmen, as were the remaining cars on the lot, 
2The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. 
Kohl 2000 UT 35, n.l, 392 Utah Adv. Rep. 3; State v. Chanev. 1999 UT App 309, Tf2, 
989 P.2d 1091. 
4 
and were not used loi an\ icasoii O IDII,.. a llu.' 1 *. 111-1111 din Ik kmed an i|l 38.65, 
7! ?) ^ .tcind 11 Inmnlhlj inventoty of cars on July 3, 1998, showed the Nissan to be in 
the fenced area (R. 38:73). 
Defendant Kenneth J. Webster began work as a salesman 101 Intermountam 
Volkswagen around June 14, IDDs (U ^MO Otfiiidnil JIII In job thmif INN n weeks 
after Waiting iitiiiiiil 1111 v *> (K. 38.63, 114). On approximately July 6 01 /, 
Intermountain's lot coordinator, Mike McGuire, saw defendant drive the Nissan from the 
lot but did not see him return (R. 38:75-79, 84)3 I in 1111 % ID a dealership manage! dim* 
to defendant's apartment to ask IIMMII Ik 1 n a il IMII unl IN < 11 n IHIIK <1 (1* \h 10 7-08). 
\\< f 1 MIII 1 t!i« Ni. an in a paiking stall at defendant's apartment complex and notified 
police (R. 38: 106-07). 
Detective Michael Cupello verified that the Nissan was the missing car belonging 
to Intermountain Volkswagen | k S^ 1IM OS) I i „ Ik 11 t nidi,, li il At It ntlant, NN ho a^id IK 
h u\ tin n fom In d 01 diiveii the tai (R. 38:108-09). Detective Cupello arrested 
defendant, Mirandized him, and drove him to the police station (R. 38:110-12) As part 
of the booking process, the officer asked defendant il lit had been ant sled heloit (II 
While the supervisor testified at ditterent times that he saw defendant in the car 
during the week of July 10 and that he saw him shortly after June 26, the jury was free to 
believe the former testimony. State v. Delanev. 869 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah App. 1994) (it is the 
trier of fact's duty to assess credibility and weigh the evidence); State v. Vigil 840 P Id 
788, 793 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied 857 P.2d 948 (1993). The facts must be viewed 
on appeal in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Chaney, 1999 UT App 30^ *p 
5 
38:111).4 Defendant responded that he had been arrested in Virginia for driving a vehicle 
off a dealership lot (R. 38:111-12). 
Detective Cupello later called defendant's wife, Elsha Gallegos, to tell her of 
defendant's arrest (R. 22; 38:112). He told Ms. Gallegos that the stolen car had been 
found in their parking lot and that defendant denied having touched it (R. 38:112-13). 
Ms. Gallegos responded, "He's lying" (R. 38:113). She explained that she and defendant 
had both been driving the car, that she had been driving in the car with defendant just two 
days earlier, and that he claimed that it was all right for him to have the car (R. 38:113-
14). She believed he had quit his job around July 8 and had taken the car back to the lot 
(R. 38:114). When told by the detective that defendant denied driving the car, Ms. 
Gallegos said, "We have a problem" (R. 38:114). The keys were never recovered (R. 38: 
109). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I: Admission of the pre-trial statements of defendant's wife to police did not 
violate the Confrontation Clause. The statements were admissible under a firmly rooted 
hearsay exception, thereby meeting the reliability requirements of the Confrontation 
Clause. Alternatively, a review of the circumstances under which defendant's wife made 
4The arresting officer explained that he routinely asked this question because if an 
accused has been booked in jail before, he would have certain identification numbers the 
officer would need to have (R. 38:111). 
6 
the statements reveals sc\cttil p.iftu iilaii/od f?,uaraiid:es «>l liusl milhin.'ss lli.tl satish 
Coir -M '^ ^ <*\^ acquirements. 
Admission of the statements did not violate the notice requirements of rule 
804(b)(5), Utah Rules of Evidence, because defendant knew before trial ol l he challenged 
statements and the State': ' •'• *i 
case h i\\ establisl les an.) entitlement to express advance notice of the exact evidentiary 
rule under which the statements might ultimately be admitted. 
Defendant did not preserve his claim that admitting h; .: ?e s pre-trial statemci r 
to police violated her ronsdliidniul injiii il.il lk'\hi! u ,. i* • • i r-- . - • 
claim a viola don ol'her constitutional right. Even if he were able to advance his claim on 
appeal, it would be without merit because the State did not compel defendant's wife to 
testify in contravention of the constitution. 
Point I I 1 I he l i ia l i mi l l |nn|K' ik .tdiniilledi i lef iTidai i l '1 i t i ik ' inn i l that In had 
pre\ ioi isl) takei i a cai from a dealership lot without authorization. The admission was 
properly offered as being probative of the noncharacter issues of identity and intent, 
which were both at issue at n i.ti I IK- mohaln e \ aiue .a UK- admission was not 
Nulb.taiiiidhilh i d u i H i o l i \u Ihr i l i i i it 't ' i n l 'm id i i r p ic j in l i t v f l i n r b y nuvdm* the 
requirements of rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. Defendant admitted committing the 
prior offense, the crux of both crimes was identical, the evidence was unlikely to inflame 
the jury, and the State's need f 01 tl le evidence on the issues ol identity and ml', nl n< as 
7 
obvious to the court as the State had put on the majority of its case before the Court 
deemed the evidence admissible. 
Point III: Because the offense of which he was convicted-wrongful 
appropriation-was both defined by the code and not specifically designated an infraction, 
defendant was not entitled to be sentenced for an infraction under Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-105(2) (1999). Further, because the jury convicted defendant of wrongful 
appropriation, which requires proof of intent, defendant was not entitled to be sentenced 
for "unauthorized control of motor vehicles," which has no similar intent requirement. 
As defendant was exposed to a third degree felony conviction under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-404.5(3)(a) when he committed the crime, the repeal of subsection (3)(e) prior to 
sentencing did not change the potential punishment for defendant's crime, thereby 
rendering his ex post facto argument meritless. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT'S WIFE TO POLICE HAD 
SUFFICIENT TRUSTWORTHINESS TO MEET 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE REQUIREMENTS; DEFENDANT 
RECEIVED THE NOTICE REQUIRED BY RULE 804(B)(5); 
DEFENDANT LACKS STANDING TO ASSERT A VIOLATION OF 
HIS WIFE'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, AND NO SUCH 
VIOLATION OCCURRED ABSENT ANY COMPULSION TO 
TESTIFY 
Defendant argues that admission at trial of statements made by his wife to Officer 
Cupello was error for three reasons: 1) the admission violated defendant's confrontation 
right because tin Jatniimfs l;n kni llie HVfitiin! indicm of reliability;5 2) the State 
allegedly failed to give defendant notice that it intended to rely on a residual hearsay 
exception to admit the statements; and 3) the use of the statements violated his wife's 
constitutional testimonial right, to defendant s detriment. Hi, mil Apll. .il ?M- \ 
A. B a c kg r o u n c j ancj j'l-jal Court Ruling 
Immediately prior to trial, defendant filed a motion seeking to allow his wife, 
Elsha Gallegos, to invoke her right not to testify against her husband (R. 22-23). During 
the resulting discussion, the prosecutor noted (li,11 lie |il.iiiin,il I<H all l\l , (iall^ju^ ih 
ldiu'l.'illK ^ , ( i " "i. mill isL'J Mi < ,;iI Irjjos if\Iir wanted to invoke her privilege 
immediately or wait until called to decide whether to testify; she decided to wait (R. 
38:38, 49-51). Before calling its last witness, the State revisited the issue, noting that it 
had decided to ^. . '*; -. Gallegos to testify in its case ii i cl lief based oi I tl le defense's 
opei ling state ' •'• -- - •"!-<•- »os tlicn invoked the privilege, leaving the State 
to seek admission of her pre-trial statements through the officer to whom she made them 
(R. 38:96-103) The State offered the statements under rules 804(b)(3) (statement against 
interest) and !b|< fc.| IUMJIIMI IK ars.t_s MIK'I (K 4S.C-><>-4->.', Kill HI |. 
5Defendant does not include a separate state constitutional argument under the 
confrontation clause, so this Court may conduct a federal constitutional analysis only. 
State v. Spurgeon. 904 P.2d 220, 224 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Dudley. 847 P 2d 424, 
426 (Utah App. 1993). 
9 
The trial court found the statements to be admissible, noting that whether the 
statements were against her interest or not, they met the criteria of rule 804(b)(5), Utah 
Rules of Evidence: 
It seems to me either they [the statements] are against her interest or they are of no 
importance at all other than, for example, one might say, "Well, today it looks like 
it might rain." They have no particular impact one way or the other. So I think for 
that reason, there is a trustworthy attachment because they are by and large mere 
statements of inconsequential events if taken in the context that you [defense 
counsel] described. 
(R. 38:102-03) (in Add. B). In other words, the court felt that, to the extent the 
statements were against Ms. Gallegos' interest, they were admissible under rule 
804(b)(3); to the extent they were not against her interest, they were admissible under rule 
804(b)(5).6 The court further held that defendant received notice that the State would 
seek admission of Ms. Gallegos' testimony, and thus, her prior statements, and that the 
language of the rule did not require the prosecution to disclose in advance the exact rule 
of evidence under which the testimony might be admitted (R. 38:103). Finally, the court 
6To the extent the lower court did not find the statements admissible under rule 
804(b)(3), this Court may nevertheless affirm on that ground because (b)(3) was argued 
below. See Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hospital 930 P.2d 904, 906 (Utah App.) (affirming 
the grant of summary judgment on an alternative basis), cert, denied 939 P.2d 683 (1997); 
see also State v. Elder. 815 P.2d 1341, 1344 n.4 (Utah App. 1991) (the appellate court 
may affirm a trial court on any basis); see also State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 357 (Utah 
1996), cert, denied 940 P.2d 1224 (1997); State v. Shepherd. 1999 UT App 305 n.4, 989 
P.2d 503 (the trial court may be affirmed on any proper basis). 
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held I ha I admission nl fin; stahiifuiK iiiulu ,i irsidujl hearsay exception did not violate 
defe* ia; ^ onstitutional confrontation rights (R. 38:103).7 
B. The Statements Possessed Sufficient Indicia of Reliability to Meet 
Confrontation Clause Requirements 
Defendant does not claiiii llt.il flu stalettieriK wciv iidniillol in \ i AMu a ul rul< 
804(111( »l I'uill i, hr chiin^ a \ tulal ion of subsection (b)(5) only insofar as he allegedly 
received no sufficient notice under the rule. See Point ID, infra. However, the fact that 
he does not contest the ability of the statements to come in under these rules does not 
settle the issue of their admissibilit)/ because w 1 letf ler ei defence n leets a hearsay exceptioi i 
dot's i lot necessarily i neai i tl lat it meets the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. 
State v. Webb. 779 P.2d 1108, !.__ 12 (Utah 1989): see also United States v. Balano. 
618 F.2d 624, 626 (10th Cir. 1979), overruled on other grounds, 4<>8 U N I I'"! M S ( ( 
30X1 (1<>S4); United States v. Sheets, i 
l 'nn^equenlh „ I'1"'11'- < '• M• rl ,« INHIM focus first on defendant's constitutional confrontation 
rights. 
To be admissible under the Confrontation Clause, the declarant must be 
guarantees of trustworthiness." United States v. Weinstock. 863 F.Supp. 1529, 1536 (D. 
7Contrary to defendant's claims, the trial court did not cite as a basis for its 
admission of Ms. Gallegos' statements the prosecutor's assurances that Ms. Gallegos was 
willing to reassert the statements for the court. Br. of Aplt. at 26. 
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Utah 1994); Julian v. State. 966 P.2d 249, 255 (Utah 1998); State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 
393, 452-53 (Utah 1994), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 1115, 115 S. Ct. 910 (1995); State v. 
Brooks. 638 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah 1981) (adopting the safeguards established in Ohio v. 
Roberts. 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S. Ct. 2531,2539 (1980)). Here, defendant does not 
challenge Ms. Gallegos' unavailability; nor could he as she was, in fact, unavailable when 
she exercised her right not to testify against her husband. Utah Constit, art I, § 12; see 
also Utah R. Evid. 804(a)(1) (a witness is unavailable when exempted from testifying on 
the ground of a privilege). Cf Martinez v. Sullivan. 881 F.2d 921, 924 (10th Cir. 1989) (a 
codefendant who invoked his right not to testify was "unavailable" for purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause), cert, denied 493 U.S. 1029, 110 S. Ct. 740 (1990). 
The trustworthiness prong is satisfied when the evidence falls within a "firmly 
rooted" exception to the hearsay rule. United States v. Aldana. 4 F.Supp.2d 1325, 1327 
(D. Utah 1998); Weinstock. 863 F.Supp. at 1536; Julian. 966 P.2d at 256; State v. Drawn. 
791 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah App. 1990). If the statements do not fall within a "firmly 
rooted" hearsay exception, this Court must look to the circumstances of the comments to 
determine whether there is any indicia of reliability to support admission of the 
statements. Aldana. 4 F.Supp. at 1327; Weinstock. 863 F.Supp. at 1536; Julian. 966 P.2d 
at 256; Drawn 791 P.2d at 894. This review includes the totality of the circumstances 
which '"surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly 
worthy of belief.'" Weinstock. 863 F.Supp. at 1536 (quoting Idaho v. Wright. 497 U.S. 
12 
805, 820, I 10 S ('( < I W, 31 ^ I l''c"0, cert, dennu 
(1995)). 
Defendant erroneously claims that the general guarantees of trustworthiness are 
absent from the challenged statements.8 Br r*f \p\. a* 
The statements were admitted ui *.. ,>,.% •*-,>. 
R uU1 K(M(h)( V| is mil A I'M mlv looted hearsay exception. Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 
F.2d 1185, 1200 (10th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds. 497 U.S. 227, 110 S. Ct. 
2822(1990); Wemstock, 863 F.Supp. at 1536. Consequently, this Court lo* K \ he 
circumstances surrounding t l - u^  . . . ..i. „, . - * innvN 
of ti i istv < orthiness exist to si ipport the statements' admission. Weinstock, 863 F.Supp. at 
8To the extent he complains that he was unable to exercise his right to cross-
examine Ms. Gallegos, the claim is without nlerit Cross-examination of the declarant is 
not a prerequisite to the statement's admission under the Confrontation Clause. United 
States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 964 (6th Cir. 1982) (introduction of defendant's wife's 
grand jury testimony upheld despite no opportunity for cross-examination where the 
requisite reliability was shown), cert, denied 461 U.S. 945, 103 S. Ct. 2124 (1983); 
United States v. Marchini. 797 F.2d 759, 765 (9th Cir. 1986) (same), overruled on other 
grounds. 497 U.S. 805, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990). Moreover, defendant has not established 
that he was unable to examine his wife about the statements. Ms. Gallegos' exercise of 
her marital testimonial privilege rendered her unavailable as a witness for the State. 
However, that privilege does not extend to prevent her from testifying when called as a 
witness by the defendant. See Engberg v. Meyer. 820 P.2d 70, 83-84 (Wy. 1991) 
(defendant's claim that his wife's invocation of her marital testimonial privilege rendered 
her unavailable to him at trial failed where he did not make any effort to call her as a 
witness in his behalf in order to establish her unavailability to him). As defendant made 
no effort to call her as a witness in his behalf, he cannot contend that he was unable to 
examine her as to her statements. 
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1536. Those guarantees are present in this case when the challenged statements are 
viewed under the circumstances surrounding their making. 
Rule 804(b)(5) provides that the following is not excluded by the hearsay rule: 
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but 
having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court 
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the 
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other 
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the 
general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence. . . . 
Following up on his investigation, Officer Cupello waited until defendant's wife 
was off work the day he arrested defendant, then called her at home to tell her of her 
husband's arrest (R. 38:112-13). Nothing suggests that Ms. Gallegos was forewarned 
about the arrest or the possibility that she would be speaking to the arresting officer. 
Accordingly, her responses to the officer's statements were spontaneous and wholly her 
own. Further, nothing suggests that the officer was investigating Ms. Gallegos or that she 
believed that she was a suspect in the crime, thus making her more likely to be candid 
with the officer. When informed about the arrest and defendant's claim that he "never 
touched the vehicle," Ms. Gallegos blurted, "He is lying" and went on to briefly explain 
that she believed her husband had permission to drive the car, and that they had driven the 
car until she got her husband to quit his job at Intermountain Volkswagen around July 8, 
at which time she believed the car was returned to the dealership (R. 38:113-14). She was 
very surprised to hear that it was discovered in her own parking lot (R. 38:114). 
14 
These circumstances give rise to sever al pai ticular ized gi larantees of 
tiuslworthiness M,, (Jalloj-'os li.id personal 'knowledge of the matters about which she 
spoke, and the matters were recent events. Hopkinson, 866 F.2d at 1201 This suggests 
intimate familiarity and recall of the events. She stated that they drove the car until it was 
returned, she believed, on Jul\ ;\ when tkiuiil.inl in In i leli hi-* job i Is 'IS'OV SO I \A). 
Ms (iallegos s«ml slu- li.nl mil di i \ en the rat alter July 8. This is in keeping with the 
other evidence of defendant's failure to appear at work, and the timing of the car's 
disappearance. 
Ms. Gallegos volunteered the statei i lei its, ai id 
was mil ielliiH> tin IIIIIIL Hopkmsoru 866 P.2d at 1201. She was not required to make 
any comment and was under no compulsion to discuss the details with the officer. The 
exchange was not such that she reasonably would be motivated to divorce herself from 
the car at her husband's expense i heic ^ no i \ nlenc< ihii -II \\ \K ttiii«;t|i«ir<l u iili 
ci i! i linal proseci ltioi I :>! < : t l lerwise made to feel a need to distance herself from the car. 
Instead, it appears that she made the statements in a spontaneous discussion with the 
officer, making it more likely that the statements accurately reflect the facts as she 
remenibeietl I hem 
Neither did she "absolve[] herself of all responsibility" for the offense, as 
defendant claims. Br. of Aplt. at 20. She admitted that both she and defendant drove and 
rode in the car in the days preceding her talk w ith I M'tu'cr Cupello, and she ie\ ealnl hu 
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own knowledge that the car came from the dealership (R. 38:114). The fact that she did 
not wholly exonerate herself from the situation suggests that she was being truthful in her 
statements. 
The mere fact that she implicates defendant does not render her statements either 
unreliable or inadmissible. Br. of Aplt. at 22-24. Instead, careful review of the 
circumstances surrounding her statements determines their admissibility. Lilly v. 
Virginia, 527 U.S. 115, 118, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1889 (1999) (while "accomplices' 
confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant" are not perse admissible and must be 
carefully reviewed, they are not necessarily incapable of qualifying for admission under a 
hearsay exception); Lee v. Illinois. 476 U.S. 530, 541, 106 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (1986). The 
circumstances surrounding Ms. Gallegos' statements suggests that she did not have the 
strong motivation to shift the entirety of the blame for the offense to the accused, as might 
occur with accomplices or co-defendants. While she arguably could have been pursued 
as an accomplice, nothing shows that she believed she would be or that the State took 
steps to do so. Further, she did not seem anxious to inculpate her husband or to get him 
in trouble, as evidenced by her refusal to testify. Consequently, her statements have an 
added indicia of honesty or guarantee of trustworthiness under the circumstances. 
Defendant contends that an officer's memory of a witness' oral statements 
necessarily lacks trustworthiness because written witness statements to police have been 
deemed to be unreliable. Br. of Aplt. at 24. In support, he cites to State v. BertuL 664 
16 
P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1983), which held that police reports of witness statements do not 
satisfy the business records exception to the hearsay rule. However, the case does not say 
that such reports cannot meet other exceptions to the hearsay rule, such as the residual 
hearsay exception. See id. at 1184 n.3. Thus, while such reports may lack the reliability 
required for the business records exception, in the right case, the circumstances 
surrounding the making of the report may well establish sufficient indicia of reliability to 
qualify under the residual exception. Such is the case here, where the circumstances 
establish sufficient indicia of reliability to permit admission of the statements under rule 
804(b)(5). 
Combined with the fact that the statements meet the additional specified 
requirements of rule 804(b)(5), the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making 
of the statements supplies sufficient indicia of reliability to weigh in favor of the 
truthfulness of the statements and to support their admission.9 
9Rule 804(b)(5) requires additionally that the trial court find that: 
. . . (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is 
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which 
the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes 
of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the 
statement into evidence. 
The trial court held that these factors were all met in this case (R. 38:103), and defendant 
does not challenge that ruling on appeal. Br. of Aplt. at 20-37. Hence, this Court may 
accept as true the unchallenged finding as to these factors. Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy 
Corp., 1999 UT App 355, f21, 993 P.2d 222 (accepting as true undisputed factual 
findings); see also Hovle v. Monson. 606 P.2d 240, 243 (Utah 1980) (accepting the trial 
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C. Assuming a Confrontation Clause Violation, Any Error was Harmless 
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
Assuming, arguendo, that Ms. Gallegos' statements lacked sufficient indicia of 
reliability to meet Confrontation Clause concerns, reversal is not warranted as the 
admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Delaware v. Van ArsdalL 475 U.S. 
673, 684, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1438 (1986) (concluding that confrontation clause error is 
subject to harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard). 
Aside from Ms. Gallegos' statements, the jury had before it other compelling 
evidence which established defendant's guilt of wrongful appropriation of the vehicle. 
Notwithstanding defendant's claim that he never touched the car, Mr. McGuire saw 
defendant behind the wheel of the car the week it was discovered missing when he saw 
him drive it off the dealership lot without any justification or authority (R. 38:76-78). No 
one else was seen driving the car or had authority to do so. When defendant quit his job, 
the car was still missing, only to be found within days at defendant's apartment complex 
(R. 38:63, 73, 77, 80, 106-08). There is no evidence that anyone else living at that 
complex had access to the Nissan. That defendant was the one to take the car and that he 
did so intentionally is reinforced by defendant's own admission that he did the same thing 
at another dealership in Virginia (R. 38:111-12).10 The only reasonable inference the jury 
could draw from the above evidence is that defendant drove the car off the lot without 
court's unassailed findings that parties were not indigent). 
l0See Point II, infra, for a discussion of the admissibility of this evidence. 
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permission, took it to his apartment complex, and did not return it after he had quit his 
job. This made out all the elements of wrongful appropriation independent of Ms. 
Gallegos' statements. Accordingly, any error in the admission of those statements was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
D. Defendant Received the Required Notice Under Rule 804(b)(5) 
Defendant argues that the statements were erroneously admitted under rule 
804(b)(5) because he received inadequate notice under the rule of the prosecutor's intent 
to admit the evidence. Br. of Aplt. at 29-32. Defendant does not claim that he did not 
know that the State anticipated using Ms. Gallegos' statements: the trial court found that 
defendant knew sufficiently in advance of trial that the State wanted to call Ms. Gallegos 
to the stand (R. 38:103), and defendant does not challenge that finding. Br. of Aplt. at 30. 
Defendant even admits that he took steps to ensure that his wife would not testify, 
including the filing of a pretrial motion seeking to ensure that she could invoke her 
marital testimonial privilege. Br. of Aplt. at 30. 
Instead, defendant claims that he lacked notice that the State anticipated using rule 
804(b)(5) as the method by which it intended to admit the statements (R. 38:97-99). Br. 
of Aplt. at 30, 32. 
Rule 804(b)(5) provides that: 
. . . a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the 
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the 
trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to 
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meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, 
including the name and address of the declarant. 
Defendant argues, without authority, that this language requires that he receive not only 
notice of the statements and the State's intent to use them, but notice of the actual rule 
under which the State will be seeking their admission (R. 38:97-99). Br. of Aplt. at 30, 
32. 
The analysis starts with the rule's plain language. "The fundamental rule of 
statutory construction is that statutes are generally to be construed according to their plain 
language. Unambiguous language in the statute may not be interpreted to contradict its 
plain meaning." State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, Tfl 1, 992 P.2d 986 (citations omitted); see 
also Kimball Condo. Owners Ass'n v. County Bd. of Equalization, 943 P.2d 642, 648 
(Utah 1997). 
In this case, the rule speaks repeatedly in terms of "the statement": "the proponent 
of it [the statement]" must make the statement known to the adverse party; there must be 
"a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it [the statement]," there must be disclosure of an 
"intention to offer the statement" as well as of "the particulars of it [the statement]." Utah 
R. Evid.804(b)(5). Nothing on the face of the rule speaks in terms of disclosing the 
particular evidentiary rule itself. 
Neither does the case law suggest that such a requirement be read into the rule. 
The State could find no case directly on point. However, the jurisdictions that have 
addressed the notice language of rule 804(b)(5), the identical language of rule 803(24), or 
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other similar language have interpreted that language as requiring notice of the 
proponent's intent to use the statements or notice of the statements themselves. See 
generally State v. Tonev. 243 Neb. 237, 498 N.W.2d 544, 550-51 (1993) (under the 
residual exception to the hearsay rule, requiring notice of the statement and its 
prospective use); State v. Dillon. 191 W.Va 648, 447 S.E.2d 583, 594, 595 n.19 (1994) 
(under rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), requiring disclosure of statement contents so the 
opposing party can meet the evidence); Williams v. Collins Communications, Inc., 720 
P.2d 880, 886 (Wyo. 1986) (requiring notice of use under a residual exception to the 
hearsay rule). None have required notice of the actual rule under which the evidence 
would be offered. This is consistent with the purpose of the notice requirement, which is 
to afford the adverse party an opportunity to attack the statement's trustworthiness. See 
United States v. Frazier, 678 F.Supp. 499, 503 (E.D. Pa. 1986). 
That defendant had an opportunity to meet the statement is evidenced by the 
sequence of events below. Defendant knew before trial of the State's intent to use the 
statements. Immediately prior to trial, defendant sought to have the declarant invoke her 
spousal privilege, which she in fact did after trial began. The prosecutor, who appeared at 
trial hoping to introduce the statements through the declarant herself, found herself unable 
to proceed as planned once Ms. Gallegos refused to testify. The State was then required 
to look at other means to admit the statement, which defendant anticipated inasmuch as he 
admits that he reviewed and excluded the use of "other hearsay exceptions" in planning 
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his defense. Br. of Aplt. at 30-31. That defense counsel missed the residual hearsay 
exception or miscalculated his ability to exclude the evidence under this exception does 
not establish that he received inadequate notice of the statement or its intended use by the 
State.11 
As stated, the plain language of the rule does not require notice of the specific 
evidentiary rule under which a statement will be offered, and it is clear from the record 
that defendant had sufficient notice of the statements as well as the prosecutor's intent to 
use them at trial to meet the notice requirements of rule 804(b)(5). Any failure of counsel 
to succeed in excluding the statements does not stem from inadequate notice that they 
were important to the State and does not establish that defendant was not prepared to 
meet the challenged statements. 
In light of the plain language of the rule, the trial court properly found that 
defendant received adequate notice of the statements as required under rule 804(b)(5). 
Defendant nevertheless claims prejudice, arguing that the lack of notice of the 
specific rule prevented him from preparing to meet the statement and resulted in great 
harm because admission of the statements necessarily required the jury to label both 
defendant and his counsel liars. Br. of Aplt. at 31-32. Defendant fails, however, to 
1
 defendant does not explain why defense counsel apparently did not review the 
residual exceptions to the hearsay rule or account for them in planning the defense. 
Neither does defendant raise any claim of ineffective assistance with regard to his 
counsel's trial preparation on this issue. 
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acknowledge that the jury was free to believe or disbelieve the officer's rendition of the 
statements. Mere admission of the statements does not establish the credibility of the 
respective witnesses. 
Defendant also overemphasizes the importance of the statements at trial, claiming 
that they alone established the essential elements of wrongful appropriation. Br. of Aplt. 
at 31. However, in addition to Ms. Gallegos' statements, the jury had before it 
defendant's claim that he never touched the car, Mr. Maguire's testimony that he saw 
defendant drive the car off the lot during the first week of July without authority or 
justification, the fact that the car was parked at defendant's complex, as well as proof of 
defendant's identity and intent through his admission of having committed the same act 
before. See Point IB, supra. In short, there was no reasonable probability that defendant 
would have been acquitted had the statements not been admitted. Consequently, 
defendant's claim of prejudice is without merit. 
E. Defendant Waived his Claim that his Wife's Marital Testimonial Privilege 
was Violated; Defendant Lacks Standing to Assert the Violation: Moreover, 
There was no Such Violation 
Defendant claims that the admission of his wife's statements amounted to a 
constitutional violation because the statements were the "functional equivalent" of 
testimony by one spouse against another in violation of Utah Constitution, Article I, 
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section 12, which provides that "a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife."12 His argument fails on three bases. 
First, defendant failed to raise the issue below and does not mention plain error or 
exceptional circumstances. Consequently, he cannot assert it as a basis of error on appeal, 
even though it involves a constitutional right. State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 
n.3 (Utah App. 1991); see also State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990). 
Second, to the extent any constitutional violation occurred, it would have been a 
violation of Ms. Gallegos' right not to testify, as the privilege mns to the declarant spouse 
and not to the accused spouse. Defendant cannot invoke his wife's marital testimonial 
privilege. See State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1228 (Utah 1997) (the privilege may be 
invoked only by the witness spouse). Neither can he assert his wife's constitutional rights 
or a violation thereof. See Jackson v. State, 498 F.Supp. 186, 190 (D. S.C. 1979) 
("constitutional rights are personal" and a husband has "no standing to assert his wife's 
rights"); State v. Brewer, 732 P.2d 780, 783 (Kan. 1980). Accordingly, defendant is 
without standing to assert this claim on appeal. See Wright v. Carver, 886 P.2d 58, 60 
(Utah 1994) (accused has no standing to challenge the trial court's dismissal of a 
complaint against another person); see generally Shelledy v. Lore, 836 P.2d 786, 789 
(Utah) (third-party standing rule requires litigants to assert their own legal rights and does 
12Defendant does not assert a claim under rule 502(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, 
involving the same marital testimonial privilege. 
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not allow them to claim relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties), cert, denied 
506 U.S. 1022, 113 S. Ct. 660 (1992); State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah 
1987) (absent claimed right to possession, defendant had no standing to object to search 
of third party's car). 
Third, the State did not violate Ms. Gallegos' constitutional right not to testify 
against her spouse because the State did not compel Ms. Gallegos to testify, as is 
forbidden by the state constitution. 
The text of the constitutional marital testimonial privilege is identical to rule 
502(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, is plain and unambiguous, and deals only with compelled 
testimony of one spouse against the other:13 
. . . The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife 
shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his 
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Utah Const, art I, § 12; Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1228. Accordingly, interpretations of the 
rule apply equally to interpretations of the constitutional right. 
The state constitutional marital testimonial privilege is a limited privilege that does 
not extend beyond the witness stand. State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 638 (Utah), cert. 
denied 516 U.S. 858, 116 S. Ct 163 (1995). It does not prevent admissibility or use of 
13In contrast, rule 502(b) deals with the marital communication privilege, which is 
designed to protect "confidential communications" between spouses only and can be 
asserted by either spouse. Doe v. Maret, 984 P.2d 980, 806-07 (Utah 1999); Robertson, 
932 P.2d at 1228. Defendant presents a constitutional argument only, and has not 
challenged the communication privilege provided by the rule. 
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everything a spouse might say. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 45, 49-50, 52-53, 
100 S. Ct. 906, 911 (1980) (noting that the Model Code of Evidence expressly rejects 
allowing defendant to claim the privilege against all adverse testimony given by his wife); 
Carter, 888 P.2d at 638-39 (agreeing with Trammel and noting that the police may 
actively use spousal statements in their investigation). "It is only the spouse's testimony 
in the courtroom that is prohibited." Carter, 888 P.2d at 638-39. When the spouse 
voluntarily speaks to police and was not forced to take the stand in person or by way of 
sworn documentation, the marital privilege is not violated. IdL, at 639. Cf, Doe v. Maret 
984 P.2d 980, 986-87 (Utah 1999) (the marital communication privilege can be waived 
through "voluntary disclosures"); ajso State v. Newman, 680 P.2d 257, 263 (Kan. 1984) 
(statements made within hearing of a third person are not covered by marital 
communication privilege); State v. Teel, 712 P.2d 792, 794 (N.M. App. 1985) (same). 
Prosecutorial use of Ms. Gallegos' out-of-court comments to police does not undermine 
the marital relationship any more than in-court testimony from a third person as to 
statements overheard between spouses, which testimony is admissible at trial. Newman, 
680P.2dat263. 
In this case, Ms. Gallegos was not compelled to testify. Once she invoked her 
marital testimonial privilege, it was scrupulously honored and she was not required to 
take the stand against her spouse. She did not submit her statements under oath, submit to 
cross-examination, or provide sworn documentation of her statements. Moreover, she 
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was not compelled to speak to the police. Defendant has not claimed that her statements 
were anything other than voluntary, although he impugns her motive for making them. 
The jury was free to reject Ms. Gallegos' statements in their entirety. 
Ms. Gallegos' pre-trial statements to the police were therefore admissible, 
notwithstanding her right to claim a marital testimonial privilege. Hence, even assuming 
defendant were in a position to assert a violation of his wife's constitutional testimonial 
privilege, no such violation occurred in this case. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED DEFENDANT'S 
ADMISSION OF PRIOR SIMILAR CONDUCT UNDER RULE 404(B) AS 
IT WAS RELEVANT TO THE MATERIAL ISSUES OF IDENTITY AND 
INTENT AND ITS PROBATIVE VALUE WAS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY 
OUTWEIGHED BY A POTENTIAL FOR UNFAIR PREJUDICE 
Defendant challenges the trial court's decision to let the jury hear that he admitted 
to committing a similar crime once before. While being taken to the police station after 
being arrested and Mirandized. defendant was asked if he had been arrested before (R. 
38:111). Defendant stated that he had been arrested in Virginia because he had driven a 
car off a dealership lot (R. 38:111-12, 131, 137). The State introduced defendant's 
statement through the arresting officer at trial (R. 38:111-12).14 
14As suggested by the prosecutor below, the statement concerning defendant's 
earlier arrest was admissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2), because it qualifies 
as a nonhearsay admission by a party-opponent (R. 38:40). State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 
1161, 1164 (Utah 1980) (an out-of-court statement made by a criminal defendant that 
constitutes an admission is admissible under rule 801(d)(2)). 
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Defendant argues that the trial court's admission of this statement violates Utah 
Rule of Evidence 404(b), which addresses the admission of evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, and bad acts.15 Br. of Aplt. at 37-42. He contends that such evidence was too 
remote, had no bearing on identity, intent or absence of mistake, and carried a potential 
for unfair prejudice which outweighed any possible probative value. Id Defendant's 
analysis, however, is flawed. 
Before evidence of other crimes is admissible under rule 404(b), the trial court 
must determine: 
(1) whether such evidence is being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose 
under 404(b), (2) whether such evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, and 
(3) whether this evidence meets the requirements of rule 403. 
State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57,1J20, 993 P.2d 837 (Utah 1999), cert, denied 120 S. Ct. 
1181 (2000). The trial court's decision is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. 
IdL at^jl8. 
The trial court determined that in light of defense counsel's opening statement 
stressing that the State would not be able to prove identity, the challenged statement was 
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
In other words, evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a 
non-character purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403. 
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"relevant and probative," and was more probative than prejudicial (R. 38:93-94) (in Add. 
C). While the court did not articulate a detailed map of its analysis, the analysis is readily 
ascertainable from the record. 
The first part of the rule 404(b) analysis requires that the evidence be offered for a 
proper, noncharacter purpose. Decorso, at ffi[20-21. The prosecutor offered it in this case 
to establish identity, intent, and absence of mistake, all of which were at issue (R. 38:91-
93). Defendant's brief opening statement below emphasized the defense strategy of 
stressing that no direct evidence put defendant in or near the car during the time it was 
found to be missing (R. 38:58-59). His closing statement followed suit (R. 38:136-37). 
He also argued in closing that the evidence did not suggest the appropriate intent, and that 
the possibility existed that defendant was framed (R. 38:137-38, 140-41). Clearly, both 
identity and intent were at issue below. 
Little was offered below by either party regarding the specifics of the Virginia 
offense.16 However, the trial judge knew that the basic crime paralleled the crime at 
hand-driving a car off a dealership lot without authorization. He also knew that the 
admission of the Virginia offense came from defendant himself, so that the jury was not 
left in a position of deciding whether defendant had committed the prior offense before 
using it to determine the issues of identity and intent in this case. See Decorso, at ^27 
16No one below identified for the trial court the specific details of the Virginia 
offense, and defendant has not claimed his counsel rendered ineffective assistance for not 
doing so. 
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(where the jury was required to decide whether defendant had participated in both the 
charged and the prior offense ). 
Because both identity and intent were at issue below, and the evidence was 
relevant to these points, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that 
defendant's admission to the Virginia offense was offered for a proper noncharacter 
purpose. 
The second part of the analysis requires a determination that the evidence meets 
the requirements of rule 402, which requires that evidence be relevant.17 Decorso, at 
lfl|20, 22. Evidence is relevant when it is probative of a material fact to the crime 
charged. Decorso, at ^[28. Both identity and intent were material and controverted issues 
at trial, as evidenced by defendant's opening and closing remarks, and the State was 
entitled to establish evidence relating thereto. That defendant admitted to having 
previously committed the same type of offense is probative of identity and intent because 
the offenses were committed in a similar manner-driving someone else's vehicle from a 
car dealership lot-and because the evidence is in the form of an admission of 
responsibility by defendant. Hence, the evidence met the relevancy test of rule 402. 
l7Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, reads: 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or 
by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which 
is not relevant is not admissible. 
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The final part of the analysis requires that the court conduct the balancing test 
articulated in rule 403. That rule provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added). The trial court acted within its discretion in 
determining that the evidence of the Virginia offense met the requirements of rule 403. 
In making such a determination, several factors may be considered, including "the 
strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime, the similarities between 
the crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the need for the 
evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably 
will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility." State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, (Utah 
1998). 
The mere fact that the trial court did not, on the record, specifically walk through 
each factor does not mean that the factors were not duly considered. Several factors are 
readily apparent from the record. For example, the strength of the evidence that the other 
crime was committed came from the fact that it was defendant himself who admitted the 
criminal conduct (R. 38:111-12). Also readily apparent is a basic similarity between the 
offenses-both involved cars being driven off a dealership lot without authority. Whatever 
other similarities might or might not exist between the offenses, this basic similarity was 
obvious and was the crux of both crimes. Further, defendant himself recognizes the 
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strength of "the similarities" between the facts below and the Virginia offense, and notes 
that the latter offense was a "near[ly] identical crime" to the current one. Br. of Aplt. at 
41. 
The State's need for the evidence is also readily apparent. Intent is not readily 
susceptible to direct evidence, and defendant made it perfectly clear below that he would 
highlight to the jury the minimal evidence of identity he thought the State would adduce 
(R. 38:58-59). Defendant did his best to limit the State's identity evidence, making 
motions immediately prior to trial to exclude his own statement as well as his wife's 
testimony, which reflected on both identity and intent (R.22-28; 38:38-51). By the time 
the court decided to admit the challenged statement, the State had already put on the 
majority of its case, giving the court some idea of the State's evidence, or lack thereof, on 
these issues and the low efficacy of alternative proof. 
Moreover, hearing that defendant admitted to driving a vehicle off a dealership lot 
is not the sort of evidence which is likely to inflame the jury or to "rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility." Shickles, 760 P.2d at 296. It is not a crime of passion, physical 
injury or extreme emotion, and there was no suggestion that defendant acted maliciously 
or damaged the vehicle he took. Further, the absence of surrounding details sanitizes the 
offense. 
Additionally, the jury was unlikely to convict defendant in order to punish him for 
having committed the Virginia offense where defendant admitted that he had already been 
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caught in Virginia (R. 38:111-12). Further, there was other evidence suggestive of 
identity and intent before the jury, minimizing whatever prejudicial effect admission of 
this evidence may have generated. See Point IB, supra. 
Defendant contends that once his wife's statements were admitted, identity, intent 
and absence of mistake were no longer at issue. Br. of Aplt. at 38. However, defendant 
placed identity and intent at issue from the moment he made his opening statement, 
thereby putting the State to its burden of adducing sufficient evidence to establish each 
element. He went on to argue both issues in his closing remarks, notwithstanding 
admission of his wife's statements. Further, his wife's statements were not conclusive of 
identity and intent when the trier of fact is entitled to reject the testimony, if it so desires. 
State v. Delanev, 869 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah App. 1994) (it is the trier of fact's duty to assess 
credibility and weigh the evidence). Finally, defendant calls "identity" and "intent to 
deprive" "critical elements of the offense." Br. of Aplt. at 31. Accordingly, his claims 
that these points were no longer at issue is incredible. 
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting defendant's 
statement that he committed a similar crime where the statement was offered for the 
proper, noncharacter purpose of establishing identity and intent, and it met the 
requirements of rules 402 and 403. Decorso, at ffl[20-35. 
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POINT III 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT CONVICTED OF AN INFRACTION 
BECAUSE THE JURY FOUND HIM GUILTY OF AN OFFENSE 
"DEFINED WITHIN THE CODE"; NEITHER WAS HE ENTITLED 
TO BE SENTENCED FOR THE LESSER OFFENSE OF 
"UNAUTHORIZED CONTROL" WHERE THE JURY CONVICTED 
HIM OF THE GREATER OFFENSE OF WRONGFUL 
APPROPRIATION 
Defendant claims that he was entitled to be convicted of an infraction or a 
misdemeanor, not a third degree felony. Br. of Aplt. at 42-45. He argues that the 
legislature failed to specify a punishment for the crime of wrongful appropriation as set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(3)(e) (Supp. 1998), therefore requiring that he be 
sentenced to an infraction under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-105(2) (1999). IcL at 42-44. 
Alternatively, he argues that he was entitled to be sentenced under the more specific of 
two possible code sections dealing with operable motor vehicles, which section should be 
punished as an infraction. Defendant's claim fails on both points. 
Defendant was charged with theft under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404, which 
provides: 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
(R. 1) (in Add. D). At defendant's request, the jury was instructed on the lesser included 
offense of wrongful appropriation under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5, which provides: 
(1) A person commits wrongful appropriation if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the property of another, without the 
consent of the owner or legal custodian and with intent to temporarily 
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appropriate, possess, or use the property or to temporarily deprive the owner 
or legal custodian of possession of the property. 
(R. 29, jury ins. 4) (in Add. A). In both cases, the jury was instructed that it must find 
that the property consisted of an operable motor vehicle (R. 29, jury ins. 3 and 4). 
The punishment for theft is set forth in section 76-6-412: 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be 
punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(in Add. D). At the time the offense occurred, section 76-6-404.5(3) set forth the 
punishment for wrongful appropriation as follows: 
(3) Wrongful appropriation is punishable one degree lower than theft, as 
provided in Section 76-6-412, so that a violation which would have been: 
(a) a second degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it had been 
theft is a third degree felony if it is wrongful appropriation; 
(b) a third degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft 
is a class A misdemeanor if it is wrongful appropriation; 
(e) an act of unauthorized control of motor vehicles, trailers, or 
semitrailers which does not constitute theft is punishable under Section 41-
la-131ir 
(Emphasis added). Section 41-la-1311 provided: 
(1) It is a class A misdemeanor for a person to exercise unauthorized 
control over a motor vehicle, trailer or semitrailer not his own, without the consent 
of the owner or lawful custodian and with intent to temporarily deprive the owner 
or lawful custodian of possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer. 
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(in Add. D). 
Section 41-la-1311 was repealed, effective May 4, 1998. Defendant committed 
the instant offense in July 1998. Section 76-6-404.5(3)(e) remained in effect until it was 
repealed by the legislature the following year on May 3, 1999, even though it referred to a 
statute no longer in existence. It was during this time that defendant committed the 
offense, was charged, and was tried. 
The jury rejected the second degree theft charge and convicted defendant of the 
lesser offense of wrongful appropriation, a third degree felony (R. 34-35). Defendant 
moved to clarify the degree of offense, arguing that he was entitled to be punished for less 
than a third degree felony (R. 42-51; 53:4-12). The trial court rejected defendant's claim, 
ruling that defendant was convicted and should be punished for a third degree felony 
pursuant to section 76-6-404.5(3)(a) (R. 56; 53:13-14) (in Add. E). 
On appeal, defendant argues that he should have been sentenced under section 76-
3-105(2) (1999), which provides: 
(2) Any offense which is an infraction within this code is expressly 
designated and any offense defined outside this code which is not designated as a 
felony or misdemeanor and for which no penalty is specified is an infraction. 
(in Add. D). Defendant argues, without supporting authority, that because section 76-6-
404.5(3)(e) referred to a non-existent code section, there was no penalty specified, 
making the offense of which he was convicted-wrongful appropriation of an operable 
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motor vehicle-necessarily punishable as an infraction under section 76-3-105(2). Br. of 
Aplt. at 44-45. Defendant misinterprets the latter section. 
Section 76-3-105 applies to "any offense defined outside this code . . . and for 
which no penalty is specified . . . . " Even assuming that no penalty was specified for 
wrongful appropriation, as defendant complains, the plain language of section 76-3-105 
prevents its application here because defendant was convicted of a crime defined within 
the code, and that crime was not specified to be an infraction. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
404.5. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to be convicted of an infraction. 
Defendant also contends that because section 76-6-404.5(3)(e) deals specifically 
with operable motor vehicles, while subsection (3)(a) deals with wrongful appropriation 
generally, the former section is "more specific" and should take precedence over the more 
general provision. Br. of Aplt. at 43-44. However, the subsections stand in a 
greater/lesser relationship, and defendant was convicted, and properly sentenced, under 
the greater provision. 
"[T]he inquiry of whether one crime is a lesser included offense of a greater crime 
under section 76-1-402, turns on the statutorily defined elements of the two crimes. That 
is, the court looks to the facts to determine what crime, or variation of the crime, was 
proved, but once this determination is made, the court looks to the statutory elements of 
the crime to determine whether it is an included offense." State v. Finlavson, 2000 UT 
10,116, 994 P.2d 1243, 1247 (quoting State v. Brooks. 908 P.2d 856, 861 (Utah 1995)). 
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See also State v. Hill 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983). Section 76-1-402 provides, in 
relevant part, that a crime is a lesser included offense when "[i]t is established by proof of 
the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense 
charged . . . . " 
Theft, with which defendant was charged, is the unauthorized control over 
another's property with a specific intent. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404. Wrongful 
appropriation, of which defendant was convicted, is the exercise of "unauthorized control 
over the property of another" with a specific intent. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(1). In 
contrast, section 76-6-404.5(3)(e), which defendant seeks to have applied, involves a 
lesser included offense of wrongful appropriation. It deals with acts of "unauthorized 
control of motor vehicles . . . which do[] not constitute theft...." Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-404.5(3)(e). No intent requirement is specified, and no additional element is 
included.18 Accordingly, guilt of unauthorized control of a motor vehicle under 
subsection (3)(e) does not automatically establish guilt of wrongful appropriation-for the 
latter, the State had to establish the additional element of the appropriate intent (R. 29, 
jury in. 5). 
Given that the jury found the requisite intent and convicted defendant of wrongful 
appropriation, the trial court did not err in sentencing defendant under subsection (3)(a) of 
18While section 41-la-1311(1) included an intent requirement, that section was not 
in existence at the time of the instant offense. Accordingly, it does not factor into the 
analysis. 
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the wrongful appropriation statute, which makes wrongful appropriation of an operable 
motor vehicle a third degree felony (R. 29, jury ins. 5, 11, 12).19 
Defendant makes an ex post facto argument, claiming that he was entitled to an 
infraction upon conviction and that the repeal of subsection (3)(e) before sentencing 
unfairly subjected him to a higher third degree felony conviction. Br. of Aplt. at 45. 
However, as established above, defendant was exposed to the third degree felony 
conviction under subsection (3)(a) when he committed the crime, and the repeal of 
subsection (3)(e) did not change the potential punishment for his crime. Accordingly, his 
argument is without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's conviction and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J / day of July, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
19If this Court deems subsection (3)(e) to be applicable, then defendant is guilty of 
no more than a class A misdemeanor under repealed section 41-la-1311. Defendant 
agrees with this proposition. 
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ADDENDUM A 
UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 
1998 Supplement 
REPLACEMENT VOLUME 8B 
1995 ED ITIO M 
76-6-404.5. Wrongful appropriation — Penalties. 
(1) A person commits wrongful appropriation if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another, without the consent of the 
owner or legal custodian and with intent to temporarily appropriate, possess, 
or use the property or to temporarily deprive the owner or legal custodian of 
possession of the property. 
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of the property to its control 
by the actor is not presumed or implied because of the owner's or legal 
custodian's consent on a previous occasion to the control of the property by any 
person. 
(3) Wrongful appropriation is punishable one degree lower than theft, as 
provided in Section 76-6-412, so that a violation which would have been: 
(a) a second degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is 
a third degree felony if it is wrongful appropriation; 
(b) a third degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is a 
class A misdemeanor if it is wrongful appropriation; 
(c) a class A misdemeanor under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is 
ft class B misdemeanor if it is wrongful appropriation; 
(d) a class B misdemeanor under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is 
a class C misdemeanor if it is wrongful appropriation; and 
(e) an act of unauthorized control of motor vehicles, trailers, or semi-
trailers which does not constitute theft is punishable under Section 
41-la-1311. 
History: C. 1M9,7S-S-404.5, enacted by L. 
IMS. ch. 13*, I i. 
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thoughts from you? 
2 I MR. HEINEMAN: I don't know see haw it can 
3 be against her interest. If she doesn't know a car 
4 is stolen, and saying I drove around in that car. 
5 It is just a statement, *I drove around in that 
6 car." She faces no possible criminal charges for 
7 it* N*a other possible reprecussions from it. It is 
g not a statement against interest. It is does not 
9 have the guarantees of trustworthiness that we need 
10 to haver here. 
11 THF COURT: Okayv fair enough. Well, in 
12 ItHTKiTiTTJ some of your abj>«etrtaxtau I hope X covered 
13 then alX becss***- r mat going to admit this proper 
14 statement hy fch>a State.. L think th*sa> ate. guarantees 
15 of trustworthixre-M. I am guessing- the offleer iar going 
IS to teLL ua aha mad*. Ghmmmz atatementa lit. tela preaencar 
17 and more importantly, r think that they * r« rtartesrentsr 
18 that, as yotr aay> Mr. Halnemen, thar* iar xro reason she 
19 should say one way or the other* 
20 It seems to me either they are against 
21 her interest or they are of no importance at all other 
22 than, for example, one might say, "Well, today it looks 
23 like it might rain." They have no particular impact 
24 one way or the other. So I think for that reason, 
25 there is a trustworthy attachment because they are 
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by and large mere statements of inconsequential events | 
if taken in the context that you described. Clearly 
meets the 
last one 
you were 
meet the 
other criteria. 
And then the last issue you raised, the 
I will address is this idea that somehow 
not given notice so you could prepare to 
evidence. It is pretty clear that these 
folks intended to have Ms. Gallegos testify if she 
were willing. So you knew that they wanted her to 
i make those statements. Clearly you had the 
opportunity to prepare to meet those. 
am going 
If tltif are offered in that context then I 
to allow that to be admitted. 
MR. HEINEMAN: Your Honan* I will, raise an 
additional objection on confrontation grounds. That 
1:.. theerre^ .im. 
[ refusing 
no way we can cross examine heir. ;, She is 
to testify* 
TKK COXTRT: Tkit i r rigkt, 
MR. HEINEMAN: And so there is nothing we 
can do with those statements. Effectively, it is 
allowing 
and that 
record. 
her to testify without having to testisfy 
violates Mr. Webster's confrontation right. 
THE COURT: You have made that for the 
It is pretty clear that the rule allows 
this type of evidence to be admitted. 
ADDENDUM C 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
MURRAY DISTRICT 
# # * * # # # * * • * * 
The State of Utah Transcript of: 
Plaintiff. TRIAL 
Kenneth J. Webster 
Defendant. Case No. 9812201411 
The above entitled cause of action 
came oxr regularly fo-r hearing- before the Honorable 
Klchsrel Btcrlran, a judg-m of the Third District. Court 
of the State of Utah*, at- Murrey* Utah** O K Thursday^ 
April. 2ftr. 19*±. 
Appegraypyy 
Par the State* Trina Blcpgdbxt* 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 rstt #th Souths 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
For the Defendant: Robert K. Heineman 
Legal Defender Assoc. 
424 East 5th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
FILED F I L i 
JAMX5 2000 
JAN 1 8 2000 J ^ 
COURT OF APPEALS T&Bar" AMU-US 
to the jury, they are going to say, "He did it before 
and let's send him." I don't see that it adds anythin 
to their case. 
If she establishes that he took the car 
and kept it, what flows from that and his prior 
statement of something that occurred in the past, 
who k n o w how much years in the past even, doesn't 
ad anything to that. 
THE COURT* Any other thoughts, Ms. 
Higgina? 
BfS- KZGQXKSz J\i*t gnickLy. Mr. Heineman 
mexttioaad. that we hJLvm shown that he took it and 
kept it, fettt I bmLLmvm* their- dmfmnwm ir he didnr^t 
kaep it. He didzL'fc take it to keep it. 
THE COURTS X he>axd the opening statement, 
Mr*. Heinemmw ha laxind the car in a. pub Lie parking 
lot used- bjr JOG ether people* 8<xr X guttt X wilX 
back track oat mar a time. X wilX ha*** to: cone Lu da 
based on thj* opexring abatement X ha.va heard,. tha*t 
portions that I have seen you want excised, and I am 
speaking to Mr. Heineman now, those portions seem to 
be to relevant given the opening statement. In that 
context of the opening statement, it seems to me 
then it becomes relevant and probative, and the 
balancing test becomes more probative than it is 
1A 
prejudicial. That would be my conclusion. I am 
glad to put that to rest. I thank you. I 
appreciate it. 
All right, I guess we will wait for Mr. 
Webster to go on back with Ms. Gallegos. 
MS. HIGGINS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Have any of you have any idea 
what the instructions should look like? Mr. 
Heineman, you submitted many. 
MR. HEINEMAN: I submitted many. I don't 
necessarily want to have all of those go to the 
jury* 
THE COURT: * You, want the lesser included 
one? 
MR. HEINEMAN: At this point I don't 
believe I do. Of course, it depends on how the' 
total evidentiary picture is at the end, but I am 
inclined for all or nothing at this point. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(Off the record discussion) 
MR. HEINEMAN: Your Honor, I do have a 
couple of objections to the State's instructions. 
First, on the possession of recently stolen property 
THE COURT: I am not into that one at all. 
What do you want me to do, Ms. Higgins, just say, 
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76-8-105. Infractions. 
(1) Infractions are not classified. 
(2) Any offense which is an infraction within this code is expressly desig-
nated and any offense defined outside this code which is not designated as a 
felony or misdemeanor and for which no penalty is specified is an infraction. 
History: C. IMS, 76-3-106, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, | 76-3-106, 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Hietory: C. 1968, 76-4-404, enacted by L. 
1973, en. 196, I 1*4404. 
764-412* Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for 
treble damages. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be 
punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 
76-1-601, at the time of the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) the value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,000 but is 
less than $5,000; 
(ii) the actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, 
or any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 
(iii) in a case not amounting to a second-degree felony, the property 
taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, 
•heep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, poultry, or a fur-bearing animal 
raised for commercial purposes; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is or 
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less 
than $300. 
(2) Any person who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Section 76-6-413, or 
commits theft of property described in Subsection 76-6-412(lXbXiii), is civilly 
liable for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the 
plaintiff, and for costs of suit and reasonable attorneys* fees. 
History: C. 1963, 764-412, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, 8 76-6-41*; 1974, ch. 32, i 18; 
1976, ch. 46, i 1; 1977, ch. 89, i 1; 1969, ch. 
78, f 1; 1966, ch. 291,1 14; 1996, ch. 139, f 1; 
1997, ch. 119,1 1; 1997, ch. 289,1 8. 
41-la-1311. Unlawful control over motor vehicles, trailers, 
or semitrailers — Penalties — Effect of prior con-
sent — Accessory or accomplice. 
(1) It is a class A misdemeanor for a person to exercise unauthorized control 
over a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer not his own, without the consent of 
the owner or lawful custodian and with intent to temporarily deprive the 
owner or lawful custodian of possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semi-
trailer. 
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer to its control by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied 
because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to 
the control of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer by the same or a differ-
ent person. 
I (3) Any person who assists in, or is a party or accessory to or an accomplice 
[to, an unauthorized taking or driving is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
t;History: L. 1935, ch. 46, § 100; 1941, ch. 
M i l ; 1941 (2nd S.S.), ch. 12, S 1; C. 1943, 
PMa-110; L. 1983, ch. 190, § 2; 1986, ch. 31, 
• 1; 1967, ch. 92, § 52; C. 1963,41-1-109; re-
pBBiliHiiii by L» 1992, ch. 1, I 168. 
UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 
4l-la-1311, 41-la-1312. Repealed. 
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Repeal*' — Laws 1998, ch. 315, § 2 repeals § as enacted by Laws 1992, ch 1, classifying the 
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U w t l " 3 ' ch. 58, | 2 repeals § 41-la-1312, 
VOLUME 5A 
1998 REPLACEMENT 
Titles 39 to 46 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaiatiff/Appellee, 
- v -
FILED DISTRICT COUR 
Third Judicial District 
NOV \tm 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Case No. 981201411FS 
KE&BETH J. WEBSTER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
REPORTER'S' TRAWSCRrPT Or PROCEEDING-
BEEQRE. THE HONORABLE MICHAEL K. BURTON 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
AUGUST Zl» 1.9199 
FILED 
UHh Court of * * • • • • 
JAM 18 
FILED 
JAN 1 8 2000 
COURT OF APPEALS 
J A N - 5 
COURT OF APPEALS 
/>/>/ sit^ti r£ ftrilAiLAJ' 
13 
1 MR- HEINEMAN: Which is an act of 
2 unauthorized control of a motor vehicle. 
3 THE COURT: Well, okay. So you're acquainting 
4 the term "wrongful appropriate" to unauthorized control, 
5 you're saying those are synonyms? 
6 MR. HEINEMAN: Yes. Unauthorized control of 
7 a motor vehicle, which is tantamount to theft, so he was 
8 charged with theft of a motor vehicle. He was acquitted 
9 of that, he was convicted of something less than that. 
10 [ It's the unauthorized control of a matox vehicle, and it 
1L tells, via. to. go to 1211... 
12 THE COURT: Okay. L actually donlt read it 
13 that way hut I fallow at? least what you** re* saying,, which, 
14 J makes me comfortable. Okay. Anything more I need to 
15 hear? 
16 MR. HEINEMAN: And if you. dort't read it the 
IT way r read* it-, therr that Just merits her question at the 
18 end there, we have to read statutes so that we give 
19 effect and meaning to all of their provisions. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. I think it's not mere 
21 (Inaudible), I think it's just a clarification. The way 
22 I read it, 76-6-405.5 (3) (e) is telling us if it were 
23 unauthorized control of a motor vehicle, then he'd do it 
24 as punished in 1311. But if it's wrongful appropriation 
25 in either A, B, C or D, then this is how we punish it. 
1 So I appreciate that in your mind it's mere surplusage, 
2 but in my mind, just a clarification of how you would 
3 deal with it. That's how I read it and that's how I see 
4 it. 
5 So I think that the correct reading of this is 
6 the crime for which Mr. Webster was convicted by sub 3, 
7 sub a of that section is a third degree felony, so 
8 that's how I see that. What do we do next? We have to 
9 sentence him. 
10 MS. FflGGINS; Yea, thank: you. 
Ill THE COURT: And I don't know, did you want to 
12 respond, to her thoughts*? r itteatt r hold you both in the-
13 utmost esteem, SQ; I. — • 
14 MR. HErNEMAfrr My recollection of our — 
15 Tffl& COURT;, I can't think af either of you 
16 pulling shenanigans so she's upset that I don*t think 
17 you1 re the Jcindt af guy who does that kind, of stuff, 
18 so. . . 
19 MR. HEINEMAN: Well, I have an ethical 
20 obligation to represent my client to the fullest of my 
21 abilities and I have to raise this matter, even though 
22 it appears that it's the Legislature that --
23 THE COURT: No, no, don't — no, no, we're 
24 talking about another thing now. She thought you laid 
25 the trap. 
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Date: Aug 24, 1999 
SENTENCE JAIL 
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SENTENCE TRUST 
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ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 18 month(s). 
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Defendant is to pay a fine of 750.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
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Case No: 981201411 
Date: Aug 24, 1999 
Pay fine to The Court. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Pay fines and fees as agreed 
No Violations of the Law 
Evaluation and Treatment as deemed necessary. 
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ADDENDUM F 
Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable. 
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situ-
ations in which the declarant: 
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from 
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or 
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the 
declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or 
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's 
statement; or 
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or 
then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's state-
ment has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other 
reasonable means. 
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, refusal, claim 
of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdo-
ing of the proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing 
the witness from attending or testifying. 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule 
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of 
the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with 
law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom 
the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor 
in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by 
direct, cross, or redirect examination, 
(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or criminal action 
or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that the 
declarant's death was imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith. 
(3) Statement against interest A statement which was at the time of its 
making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or 
so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render 
invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in 
the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it 
to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and 
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circum-
stances clearly indicate the tnistworthiness of the statement. 
(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement concerning the 
declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by 
blood, adoption or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or 
family history, even though the declarant had no means of acquiring personal 
knowledge of the matter stated; or (B) a statement concerning the foregoing 
matters, and death also, of another person, if the declarant was related to the 
other by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with the 
other's family as to be likely to have accurate information concerning the 
matter declared. 
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the 
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as 
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for 
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure 
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the 
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into 
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception 
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in 
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair 
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the 
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the 
declarant. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
ADDENDUM G 
AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED 
STATES 
AMENDMENT VT 
[Righto of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall eiyoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.} 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
